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RECORD DISTRIBUTORS' MINIMUM
ADVERTISED PRICE PROVISIONS: TRIPPING
ANTITRUST DURING PURSUIT OF REVENUE,
CONTROL, AND SURVIVAL IN THE OPENLY
COMPETITIVE DIGITAL ERA
I. INTRODUCTION
Compact disc ("CD")1 retail prices have climbed to upwards of
eighteen dollars per disc since the early 1990s. 2 Yet, retail competition has
steadily increased during the same period,.3  Simultaneously, technology
has effectively reduced CD manufacturing costs. 4  In light of these
economic realities, why do CDs remain so expensive?
CD prices have made the five major distributors of prerecorded music
("Distributors"), 5 and numerous prominent U.S. music retail chains
1. A compact disc ("CD") is a 5.5 inch circular plastic disc that stores sound recordings in
the form of digital codes and is designed for playback by a CD player or, more modernly, for
recording by a CD burner. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF
MUSIC, THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 391 (Billboard Books 8th ed., 2000).
2. Alwyn Scott & Tricia Duryee, Recording Industry, Discounters, Consumers Fight over
CD Prices, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 14,2000, at Al.
3. See Lionel S. Sobel & Carol P. Sobel, Major Record Companies Settle FTC Proceedings
by Agreeing To Consent Orders that Require Them To Drop Minimum Advertised Price
Provisions of their Cooperative Advertising Programs, ENT. LAW. REP., June 2000, at 8.
4. Id. Records, cassettes, and CDs are generally inexpensive to manufacture. DONALD E.
BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 558 (Praeger
Publishers 3d ed., 1996). Although a typical CD can be manufactured for less than one dollar,
distributors must also invest in the production, promotion, and advertising of CDs. Id. For point
of reference, the approximate breakeven point for a typical CD released by a major distributor is
250,000 retail units sold. Id. Naturally, increases in production, promotion, and/or advertising
costs may explain the rise in CD prices, despite decreased manufacturing costs and increased
competition. As explained in Part II.B, however, a Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
investigation linked a distinct increase in CD prices to the distributors' minimum advertised price
provisions ("MAPs") independent of increases in production, promotion, and advertising costs.
See Notices, 65 Fed. Reg. 31319 (May 17, 2000) [hereinafter FTC Notices].
5. Currently, the five major record distributors are Sony Music Distribution, Universal
Music & Video Distribution, BMG Distribution, Wamer-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation, and EMI
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("Retailers"), 6 the targets of consumer contempt and legal scrutiny.7 Costly
CDs have motivated consumers to discover alternatives to retail purchase,
some of which are unlawful. 8 Costly CDs have also provoked a multi-State
antitrust class action suit disputing the CD pricing practices of Distributors
and Retailers. 9 In addition, European economic regulators recently opened
investigations into the practices.10
The legal scrutiny of the Distributors' and Retailers' pricing practices
began in 1997 with a Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")"1 investigation
triggered in part by costly CDs.12 The investigation implicated Distributor-
Retailer marketing provisions termed "minimum advertised price"
("MAPs"). 13  According to the FTC, Distributors enacted MAPs to
counteract declining CD prices triggered by newfound retail competition in
the prerecorded music market, and Retailers executed MAPs for that
purpose. 14  MAPs accomplished that purpose. 15  In the process, MAPs
caused consumers to pay an added $480 million for prerecorded music
Music Distribution ("Distributors"). FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319; Sobel & Sobel, supra
note 3, at 8.
6. The traditional retailers, for the purposes of this Comment, are Tower Records,
Musicland, and Trans World ("Retailers"). Second Amended Complaint at 6, In re Compact Disc
Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation (D. Me. filed Nov. 29, 2000) (No. 1361)
[hereinafter Complaint].
7. See id.
8. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
9. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.
10. Audio Notes, AUDIO WEEK, Feb. 5, 2001.
11. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is an independent federal regulatory agency
created for public enforcement of antitrust law. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 3.01, at 37 (3d ed. 1998).
The FTC has civil jurisdiction over the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTCA"). Id. Specifically, § 5 of the FTCA outlaws "unfair methods of
competition" that clearly violate § 1 of the Sherman Act or that constitute incipient violations of
same. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing
Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS.
L. REV. 887, 908-09 (1983). In contrast to the Sherman Act, the FTCA does not require
concerted action as a requisite to violation. Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An
Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887, 908-09
(1983).
12. Tim Carvell, The Crazy Record Business: These Prices Are Really Insane, FORTUNE,
Aug. 1997, at 116.
13. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319.
14. Id. at 31320.
15. Id.
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products.' 6  The FTC consequently concluded that MAPs amounted to
unfair methods of competition prohibited by antitrust law. 7
Without admitting wrongdoing or paying any damages, Distributors
settled with the FTC by agreeing to postpone MAPs for seven years.'
8
News of the FTC's findings confirmed long-held consumer suspicions
regarding CD prices: record industry conglomerates price-gouge music
consumers to pad corporate margins.' 9
Months after the FTC's announcement of the settlement, the attorneys
general of forty-two states and three U.S. territories (collectively "States")
filed antitrust class actions against the Distributors and Retailers.20 Those
actions were subsequently consolidated for adjudication in the District of
Maine.2  The consolidated suit alleges MAPs legally harmed consumers by
artificially fixing CD prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The States may recover up to $1.5 billion in treble damages if they
succeed. 3 Further, injunctive relief sought by the States may restrict the
ability of Distributors and Retailers to direct the prices of their products.2 4
In retrospect, what Distributors and Retailers launched as a simple solution
boomeranged as a complex problem.25
This Comment evaluates the legality of MAPs under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and further assesses their broader impact on the prerecorded
music market. Part II highlights section 1 of the Sherman Act and its
regulation of business practices that restrain trade. Discussed against that
16. Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music
Market, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
17. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321. Specifically, the FTC concluded that MAPs
violated section 5 of the FTCA (15 U.S.C. § 45) and potentially constituted unlawful restraints of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C § 1). Id.
18. Id. at 31320.
19. Sobel & Sobel, supra note 3, at 8.
20. See In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Litigation, No. 1361, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15928, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Consolidation Order]; Complaint,
supra note 6, at 3. The States are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Complaint, supra note 6, at 3. The United States Territories are the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Id.
21. Consolidation Order, supra note 20.
22. Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
23. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
24. Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
25. See e.g., Ed Christman, Retail Track: Labels Must Take Long-Term View To Avoid Price
War Fallout, BILLBOARD, Dec. 9, 2000, at 82.
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background are the history and purpose of MAPs and the pending antitrust
suit challenging the pricing practices of Distributors and Retailers. Part III
proposes that MAPs resemble horizontal and vertical restraints of trade
outlawed by section 1 of the Sherman Act. From a related perspective, Part
IV posits that MAPs have cost the music industry by fostering music
piracy 26  and by artificially supporting physical distribution to the
impediment of more efficient means. Part V concludes that Distributors
and Retailers are better served by evolving to contend with newfound
competition rather than enacting provisions to impede competition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sherman Antitrust Act: The Charter of Economic Competition
The American free enterprise economy hinges on free and unfettered
27competition between businesses. As articulated by the Supreme Court,
the premise of free and unfettered competition is that "unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress.
28
The Sherman Antitrust Act 29 is the charter of free and unfettered
competition. 30 The Sherman Act was enacted over one hundred years ago
to preserve the free enterprise environment from domination by powerful
conglomerates, 31 yet it is applicable more than ever to the competitive
26. Piracy refers to the unauthorized duplication of copyrighted music for sale or exchange.
John Gibeaut, Facing the Music, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 37. For the purposes of this Comment,
piracy delineates CD burning and Internet file swapping. CD burning is the process by which
digital signals representing sound recordings (songs) are digitally encoded onto a blank CD via
either a properly equipped computer or a stand-alone duplication device called a CD burner. See
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 446. The actual digital signals used can come from a
variety of sources including prerecorded CDs (i.e., a store-bought original or a previously
duplicated CD) and compressed sound file formats created by computer software (e.g., mp3). Id.
Internet file swapping refers to the practice by which music from prerecorded CDs is converted to
compressed sound files by encoding computer software in a process called "ripping." Id. The
sound files can then be emailed to others or posted on a website for downloading by other Internet
users. Id. Regardless of how they are obtained, the sound files can ultimately be played back
either directly from the computer hard disc or by "burning" the files onto a CD for playback. Id.
The software necessary to encode, decode, and bum the sound files is available free of charge on
the Internet, and the entire swapping process can take mere minutes. Id.
27. Nat'l Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
28. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1,4 (1958).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
30. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. at 4.
31. Id. at 4-5.
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American economy of the new millennium. 32 As in years past, established
businesses may aggregate to maintain their market power to the detriment
of nascent competitors. 33  Consequently, preservation of the free market
environment as facilitated by the Sherman Act is vital in ensuring that
competitors have the opportunity to introduce novel goods and services to
the marketplace at the most competitive prices for the ultimate benefit of
consumers.
3 4
1. Market Restraints Implicate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
In a freely competitive market, 35 market forces forge the prices of
36goods and services. Market restraints, or restraints of trade, are business
practices that obstruct market forces.37 According to the Supreme Court, a
market restraint "refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a
particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances.
' 38
Conceptually, market restraints assume two general orientations.39
Restraints resulting from agreements among competing firms or businesses
are classified as horizontal. 40 Restraints resulting from agreements between
firms or businesses at different levels of distribution are classified as
vertical.41 Price fixing is a type of market restraint that can arise in either
the horizontal or vertical orientation.4 2
32. David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61, 132 (1999).
33. Id. at 105. Maintenance of the free market is especially important in light of distribution
on the Internet. Id. Commerce on the Internet ("ecommerce") has grown exponentially and
antitrust laws help foster that growth by preventing established distributors and retailers from
engaging in practices (e.g. boycotting) that suppress emerging ecommerce businesses in their
legitimate struggles to get market share. Id.
34. See Nat 'l Soc"y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
35. In the antitrust context, the term "market" refers to the interaction between buyers and
sellers. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 1.01, at 2.
36. Id. § 2.02[C], at 14; see Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692; N. Pac. Ry. Co.,
365 U.S. at 4-5.
37. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
38. Id. at 731.
39. Id. at 730.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.01, at 109, § 5.01, at 217. Other types of
market restraints include market divisions and concerted refusals to deal. Id. § 4.01, at 109.
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Regardless of orientation, market restraints are suspect under section
1 of the Sherman Act.43 Section 1 forbids "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 44  Courts
interchangeably use the terms "contract," "combination" and "conspiracy"
to signify some sort of concerted action or arrangement between the alleged
violators.45
Not all market restraints, however, automatically violate section 1 46
As recognized by the Supreme Court, certain arrangements implicating
trade may actually promote competition in the pertinent market thereby
realizing the Sherman Act principle.47 Consequently, the Supreme Court
has interpreted section 1 as outlawing only those arrangements that
unreasonably restrain trade.48
2. Business Practices Affecting Price May Unreasonably Restrain Trade
Business practices that fix price, either directly or indirectly,
shortchange free market forces from forging prices. 49 Consequently, the
Supreme Court declared decades ago that any "combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce"
constitutes an unreasonable price fixing restraint under section 1.50 Under
comparable standards, business practices that restrict the ability of
43. Bus. Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. at 723-24.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
45. The Supreme Court has not differentiated the terms, instead stating that in section 1
cases, "[T]here is the basic distinction between concerted and independent action ...."
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). Lower courts have
consequently labeled trade-restraining arrangements, agreements, or combinations as concerted
action. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978) (expressing that there is "no distinction between the terms combination and
conspiracy" and noting that their reading of section 1 cases indicates that these two terms are
interchangeably used); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1455 (1 1th Cir. 1991)
(stating "[t]he terms 'contract, combination.. .or conspiracy are used interchangeably to describe
the requisite agreement between two or more persons to restrain trade").
46. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
47. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917).
48. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723.
49. Nat'l Soc 'y of Profl Eng 'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)).
50. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 213.
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businesses to freely advertise prices may amount to unreasonable restraints
because they may have price fixing effects. 5'
a. Establishing Concerted Action
The threshold requirement under section 1 is that a given business
practice must be the product of concerted action among the alleged
violators. 2 Direct evidence, such as an express agreement or documented
records of a meeting between businesses, signifies concerted action.53
Alternatively, the conduct of businesses in light of surrounding
circumstances may support the existence of tacit concerted action.54
In practice, businesses rarely agree to overtly price fix, therefore, the
majority of cases turn on whether circumstantial evidence supports tacit
concerted action.55 The central question becomes whether the businesses'
conduct flows from independent decision-making or whether it reflects a
meeting of the minds.56 Thus, proof that business practices are entirely
unilateral negates the inference of concerted action.
57
In the horizontal orientation, concerted action may be implied from a
pattern of uniform business action among competitors, known as conscious
parallel conduct, supported by one or more "plus factors. ' 58 Plus factors
are additional facts supporting the inference of concerted action.59
Specifically, plus factors may include: conduct by an actor that radically
departs from prior practice; an actor's awareness that its co-competitors
were solicited to cooperate; a substantial profit motive for the actor to
engage in concerted action; actual participation in substantially uniform
conduct with co-competitors; and circumstances in which the actor's
60compliance is more economically sensible than independent action.
51. See Morales v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977).
52. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 761; Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'I Eng"rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
53. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.15[A][2], at 182.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
57. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 761.
58. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1939).
59. Clark, supra note 11, at 911-12. Currently, "plus factors" represent the standard from
which horizontal agreements can be inferred. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.15[A],
at 187.
60. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. at 222-23.
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Evidence comporting with this standard signifies a horizontal restraint
under section 1.61
In the vertical orientation, concerted action may be implied from
"direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the
[alleged violators] 'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective.' ' 62 According to the Supreme
Court, there must be direct or circumstantial "evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility that the [businesses] were acting independently. 63
In particular, a meeting of the minds may be implied from the informed
acquiescence of one party to the practice or scheme of another.
64
Alternatively, a meeting of the minds may be implied where a party uses
coercive tactics or threats of refusal to deal in order to secure adherence to
its price terms. 65  Evidence comporting with these standards signifies a
vertical restraint under section 1.66 A vertical restraint implicating price or
price levels is termed a resale price maintenance agreement ("RPM
agreement").
67
b. Assessing the Impact on Competition
Assuming the existence of concerted action, the next inquiry is
whether the restraint resulting from that action unreasonably impedes
competition within the pertinent market.68 This inquiry considers the facts
particular to the pertinent market together with the history, purpose, and
effect of the restraint in question. 69 Notably, a "good intention" does not
validate a restraint that is anti-competitive on balance.70  The intent
underlying a restraint is considered, however, in predicting its impact on
competitors as well as on competition.
71
Over time, two standards have evolved for assessing the
reasonableness of restraints under section 1.72 Under the more restrictive
61. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.01, at 109.
62. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 764 (citing Edward J. Sweeny & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
63. Id.
64. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. at 226.
65. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960).
66. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02, at 218.
67. Id.
68. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238; Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723.
69. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723.
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per se rule, restraints having a "pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue" are judged per se unlawful. 73 Courts generally
apply the per se rule where the circumstances espouse such a likelihood of
74
anti-competitive impact that a deeper evaluation of the restraint is in vain.
Per se analysis is consequently not suitable for novel business practices
whose competitive impact is not immediately obvious.v5
The more lenient rule of reason enables courts to evaluate the
rationale of novel business practices to assess competitive impact7 6 Under
this standard, a restraint is judged on a case-by-case basis, thereby allowing
the factfinder to balance competing factors in the context of the pertinent
market.77  Factors balanced include the characteristics of the pertinent
market, the condition of the market before and after the practice, and the
actual or probable effect of the restraint on competition. 8 On balance, a
restraint violates the rule of reason when the anti-competitive impact
outweighs any pro-competitive pledges or effects.79
B. Record Distributors' MAP Provisions: Unlawful Restraints Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act?
1. History of the MAP Provisions
73. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1978) (specifying the per se rule applies to restraints "that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output").
74. NCAA, 486 U.S. at 103-04; see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prorl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692
(expressing the per se rule applies to arrangements "whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality").
75. NCAA, 486 U.S. at 103-04; Nat'l Soc 'y ofProf'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692. Naturally, the
less experience the courts have with a challenged practice, the more necessary it becomes to
conduct a detailed factual inquiry to ascertain the purpose, effect, and ultimately, the anti-
competitive impact, if any, of that practice in the pertinent market. SULLIVAN & HARRISON,
supra note 11, § 4.05, at 122.
76. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723. Articulating the reasoning behind a court's decision
to apply the per se rule or the rule of reason, the Eleventh Circuit expressed that the per se rule is
applied "'only when history and analysis have shown that in sufficient similar circumstances the
rule of reason unequivocally results in a finding of liability,' i.e., when the conduct involved
always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output." Levine v. Cent. Fla.
Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (citing Consultants & Designees, Inc.
v. Butter Serv. Group, Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1983)).
77. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723; Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692;
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The evolution of MAPs correlates with CD prices at both the retail
and wholesale levels. By the early 1990s, Distributors sold CDs to
Retailers for approximately ten dollars per disc.80  Distributors were
content with the arrangement because they charged appealing markups on
each CD.81  Retailers were satisfied because they sold each CD for
approximately four dollars over the wholesale purchase price. To
promote retail sales, Distributors customarily granted each Retailer
marketing and advertising funds under a cooperative advertising program
("COOP").
83
By 1993, the emergence of a new breed of CD retailer, the national
consumer electronics chains ("Discounters"), 84 disrupted the Distributor-
Retailer dynamic.85 Unlike Retailers whose profits flowed almost entirely
from the sale of CDs and other music-related products, Discounters reaped
earnings primarily from mass-selling consumer electronics such as
televisions, computers, and home appliances.86  Additionally, unlike
Retailers that were typically located in high rent areas such as malls and
promenades, Discounters took space in low rent warehouses to minimize
87overhead. Discounters needed the perfect bait to attract consumers to
their more isolated locations, and CDs fulfilled this need.88
Discounters began purchasing CDs from Distributors in bulk, pricing
them two to three dollars below Retailers' customary prices, then
promoting them heavily in self-funded advertisements. 89  Discounters
earned only slight profits on the discounted CDs, and periodically even
sold them at a loss, but the Discounters' strategy was to entice consumers
with CDs, and then sell them consumer electronics. 90 Discounters were
80. Carvell, supra note 12, at 110. CDs gradually replaced cassette tapes as the primary
format for the distribution of prerecorded music during the 1980s. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319-20. In the traditional COOP, a distributor
provides desiring retailers with funds to assist those retailers in promoting and advertising a given
product. Balto, supra note 32, at 99 n.214. The distributor customarily conditions the
disbursement of COOP funds on the retailer's advertising the given product at or above a price
level suggested by the manufacturer in those advertisements funded entirely by the COOP dollars.
Id.
84. Consumer electronics discounters include Best Buy and Circuit City. Complaint, supra
note 6, at 5.
85. See id.
86. Carvell, supra note 12, at 110.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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also able to offset discounting and losses from CD sales with COOP funds
they received from Distributors. 91  The Discounters' strategy proved
effective.
92
Over time, consumer electronics Discounters multiplied throughout
the United States.93 Distributors were delighted as the proliferation of
Discounters translated into large wholesale orders.94 Retailers, on the other
hand, quickly realized that the Discounters' advertisements exposed them
as overpriced in comparison.95 Retailers needed to lower prices to compete
amidst this new market dynamic, which they did, and intense retail
competition ensued.96
Before long, the newfound retail competition became financially
unbearable for Retailers. 97  In contrast to Discounters, Retailers were
dependent on COOP funds to advertise, and they relied on CDs as their
primary means of subsistence. 98 Simultaneously, however, market forces
pressured Retailers to discount that very product to remain competitive.
99
Faced with this dilemma, Retailers pressured Distributors for
intervention to counteract discounting.100  Distributors were initially
apathetic. 0 1 After a number of celebrated Retailers filed for bankruptcy,
however, Distributors realized their primary product outlet had
destabilized.
0 2
Between 1992 and 1993, Distributors mounted a rescue effort in the
form of minimum advertised pricing provisions. 10 3 The provisions were
enacted as part of the customary Distributor-Retailer COOP. 10 4 Yet, the
provisions modified the COOP by setting more restrictive conditions on
Retailers' and Discounters' (collectively "Resellers") receipt of COOP
funds. 10 5 Specifically, the provisions declared that "any store that undercut
91. Id.
92. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
93. Carvell, supra note 12, at 110.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
97. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
98. Carvell, supra note 12, at 114.
99. Id. at 113.
100. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320; Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
101. Carvell, supra note 12, at 112-13.
102. Id.
103. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
104. Id. at 31319.
105. Carvell, supra note 12, at 112.
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[a minimum advertised price] would be cut off from ... advertising
support.'
10 6
This initial series of provisions, however, contained loopholes. 07 The
pricing restrictions did not apply to all advertisements and in-store
displays, 10 8 and they were not strictly enforced. 10 9  Discounters retained
wiggle room to lower prices, so discounting continued and retail prices
continued to decline." 10
Facing aggressive competition, Retailers insisted that Distributors
enact stricter minimum advertised price provisions."' This pressure
accumulated at the National Association of Recording Merchandisers
("NARM") 1 2 annual convention in 1995, at which Jack Eugster, the CEO
of Retailer Musicland, openly expressed the need for Distributors to modify
the existing provisions and to police them." 3  Delivering the keynote
address at the convention, Eugster explicitly urged Distributors to extend
advertisement restrictions to "in-store pricing as well as advertised prices"
and to condition "co-op support for the entire ad" on compliance with those
restrictions." ' 14  After the convention, representatives of numerous other
Retailers pressured Distributors to respond with stricter restrictions.'5
Foreseeing the impact decreasing retail prices could have on
wholesale margins, Distributors responded." 6  In January 1996, one
Distributor modified its provision to essentially include those terms urged
by Retailers." 7 Shortly thereafter, other Distributors made near-identical
modifications. 1 8  Within months, all five Distributors catalogued
106. Id.
107. Ed Christman, Retail Track: Three Is the Magic Number as EMD Toughens Its MAP,
BILLBOARD, June 8, 1996, at 86.
108. Id.
109. Chris Morris, Declaration of Independence: Critical Factors in Retail Nosedive
Outlined at NAIRD Convention, BILLBOARD, June 8, 1996, at 16.
110. Id.; Christman, supra note 107, at 86.
111. Christman, supra note 107, at 86; Complaint, supra note 6, at 14; Ed Christman, Sony
Distribution to Raise MAP by $1: Minimum Advertised Price Goes To $11.88-$13.88,
BILLBOARD, Mar. 22, 1997, at 3; Carvell, supra note 12, at 112-13.
112. NARM is an industry trade association of which Distributors and Retailers are
members. Complaint, supra note 6, at 12. The association holds regular meetings or conventions
in which the Distributors, Retailers, and other music industry constituents discuss issues affecting
their industry. Id. at 13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 13-14.
116. Christman, supra note 11l, at 3.
117. Complaint, supra note 6, at 15; see also FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 131320
(supporting the statement expressed in the Complaint).
118. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
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analogous provisions, known as MAPs. 119 Distributors then publicized
their efforts, acknowledging that MAPs were in response to Retailers'
requests. 20  Thereafter, Retailers expressly thanked Distributors and
proceeded to execute MAPs at the retail level.1 2' Discounters, on the other
hand, loathed MAPs for interfering with their ability to discount, but each
risked losing all COOP funds for failing to comply.
122
2. Terms of the Modified MAPs
MAPs prohibited all Resellers receiving COOP funds from
advertising CDs below the Distributors' MAP-specified minimum in any
advertisements.1 23 The advertisement terms encompassed all in-store signs
and displays. 24 Only the small price tags affixed by Resellers to the actual
CDs remained unrestricted. 25 Further, "advertisement" broadly embraced
all print and media advertising.1 26  Even those advertisements paid for
entirely by Resellers were restricted to the MAP-specified minimum. 
27
Distributors aggressively enforced MAPs to ensure compliance.128
Any Reseller discovered advertising a Distributor's CDs below the MAP-
specified minimums was denied all COOP funds from that Distributor.
29
119. Id.
120. Christman, supra note 111, at 3.
121. Complaint, supra note 6, at 16.
122. Christman, supra note 107, at 86.
123. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321.
124. Id. at 31319. "In store advertising or promotion" refers to "any promotional effort
conducted in or on the physical premises of the [reseller] or a [reseller-controlled] internet site,
including but not limited to, signs, bin cards, end caps, hit walls, listening posts, internet banner
advertisements, and promotional stickers." See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re
BMG Music (FTC No. 971-0070), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/bmgmusicagre.
htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) [hereinafter BMG Agreement Containing Consent Order].
125. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321.
126. Id. at 31319. "Media advertisement" referred to "any promotional effort by a [Retailer]
outside of the [Retailer's] physical location or [Retailer-controlled] internet site, including but not
limited to, print, radio, billboards, or television." See, e.g., BMG Agreement Containing Consent
Order, supra note 124.
127. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319.
128. Id. at 31319-20.
129. Id. Discounters occasionally discounted certain CD titles, advertising that the CD was
available at a "guaranteed low price" to avoid MAP violations. Id. at 31321. Yet these
discounters were publicly sanctioned. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 107, at 86 (reporting
Polygram Group Distribution's ("PGD") sanctioning of a Nebraska and an Illinois discounter).
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Such sanctions lasted sixty to ninety days for a single violation and could
be extended up to one year for multiple violations. 1
30
3. FTC Investigation Faults MAPs
By 1997, retail CD prices gradually leveled off and, in fact, slowly
increased.' 3 ' During the same period, however, the intense retail
competition of Discounters, coupled with other economic factors, dictated
decreasing CD prices.'32 On April 1997, this paradoxical trend prompted
the FTC to investigate CD pricing practices in the prerecorded music
market. 1
33
After a formal investigation, the FTC linked MAPs to a distinct
increase in retail prices that, in turn, enabled Distributors to raise wholesale
prices. 134  Based on its investigation, the FTC estimated that American
consumers spent an added $480 million for prerecorded music during the
period MAPs were implemented. 35 Consequently, the FTC concluded that
distributors' MAPs amounted to unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and that MAPs likely violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
136
To restore price competition, the FTC proposed a settlement
obligating Distributors to discontinue MAPs for seven years.
137
Distributors agreed to the settlement without admitting the FTC's findings
130. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319-20. See, e.g., BMG Agreement Containing
Consent Order, supra note 124 (providing that a three-time violation by any reseller in a twelve
month period resulted in "a suspension of all cooperative advertising and promotional funds for
up to twelve months").
131. Sobel & Sobel, supra note 3, at 8.
132. Id.
133. Carvell, supra note 12, at 116.
134. Id.
135. Sobel & Sobel, supra note 3, at 8.
136. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321.
137. Id. at 31320. More specifically, "[t]here are five separate complaints and proposed
consent orders in this matter, one for each of the distributors, which are virtually identical with
the exception of minor variations related to the corporate structure of each respondent." Id. at
31319. Part One of the orders provides definitions and clarifies that the provisions "apply to
cooperative funding efforts regardless of whether the retailer sells prerecorded music in
traditional retail stores or over the Internet." Id. at 31320. Part Two of the orders requires that
the MAP provisions be discontinued in their entirety for seven years. Id. Part Three details
specific provisions ensuring that none of the distributors can otherwise maintain their anti-
competitive conduct. Id. The remaining parts of the consent orders note provisions addressing
specific variations among the distributors. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
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or any legal violations, and without paying any damages. 1 8  To date,
Distributors assert they settled to avoid costly, protracted litigation.
39
Absent a settlement, the pending antitrust action 140 now renders litigation
inevitable.
4. Antitrust Class Action Asserts MAPs Fixed CD Prices
Within weeks of the FTC settlement, attorneys general of over thirty
States filed parens patriae actions141 seeking damages under the Sherman
Act for injuries caused by MAPs to their respective citizen-consumers.
142
The number of suits continued to grow and on October 20, 2000, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated actions from forty-
two States and three U.S. territories, and transferred the suit to the District
of Maine for adjudication. 143 The consolidated suit names the Distributors
and a number of Retailers as defendants.144
The States allege Distributors and Retailers "transformed their MAP
programs into blunt and effective instruments for putting an end to price
138. Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music
Market, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2001). The
settlement between the FTC and each Distributor "is for settlement purposes only and does not
constitute an admission of a law violation." Id. The consent order does, however, carry with it
"the force of the law with respect to future actions." Id. Further, "[e]ach violation of such an
order may result in a civil penalty of $11,000." Id.
139. Christopher Stern, Big Labels Accused of Fixing CD Prices: States Also Name Record
Chains, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at E3.
140. See generally Consolidation Order, supra note 20.
141. Parens patriae denotes the authority of state attorneys general, pursuant to the Clayton.
Act (15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (1994)), to assert a cause of action under the Sherman Act on behalf of
allegedly injured consumers residing within their respective states. SULLIVAN & HARRISON,
supra note 11, § 3.01, at 37. The action may be for treble damages or equitable relief and may in
addition seek reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Id. As provided in the Clayton Act, the
purpose of the parens patriae cause of action is to enable a means of: 1) redressing consumers
whose individual losses may be too small to justify private litigation and 2) supplementing the
enforcement of antitrust laws by federal agencies. Id.
142. Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
143. Consolidation Order, supra note 20. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was
created by the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1994). The Judicial
Panel was created to promote judicial economy with respect to multi jurisdiction lawsuits and to
minimize inconsistent ruling across jurisdictions. Id. Specifically, the Panel is authorized to
consolidate and transfer to a single district for adjudication those civil actions: 1) involving one or
more common questions of law and/or fact; 2) that are pending in different jurisdictions and 3)
whose transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses. Id. With the exception of
parens patriae actions, transfer is for pretrial proceedings only (meaning that while all other
actions must be remanded to their original forums for trial, parens patriae actions may be fully
litigated in the transferee jurisdiction). Id.
144. Complaint, supra note 6, at 6-9.
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competition., 145  The States seek treble damages that may reach $1.5
billion, 146  and they seek injunctive relief forbidding comparable
Distributor-Retailer practices in the future. 147 The States believe a victory
will allow CD prices to return to levels dictated by market forces and will
punish Distributors and Retailers for their anti-competitive tactics. 
148
Distributors and Retailers deny any wrongdoing and pledge to
vigorously contest all allegations. 149 Distributors contend MAPs in fact
benefited, consumers by enhancing retail competition. 150 Similarly,
Retailers declare that the States' action lacks merit. 151 Both maintain that it
is the discounting championed by the States that actually harms the music
industry. 52 In the meantime, the prerecorded music market remains MAP-
free.' 53
III. MAP PROVISIONS RESEMBLE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS OF TRADE OUTLAWED BY SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
MAPs can be analyzed as both horizontal and vertical restraints of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 154  Indirect evidence suggests
MAPs are the product of a horizontal arrangement ("combination") among
the Distributors.1 55  More direct evidence likens MAPs to vertical RPM
145. Id. at 14. New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, commented, "[B]ecause of
these conspiracies, tens of million of consumers paid inflated prices to buy CDs." Ed Christman,
Industry Defends MAP in Wake of Antitrust Suit, BILLBOARD, Aug. 19, 2000, at 6. To Spitzer,
America's "business economy has been built on the notion of fair and free competition." Id.
"When there is illegal activity to fix prices-as was the case here," reasons Spitzer, "the
consumer is always the loser." Id.
146. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
147. Complaint, supra note 6, at 6-9.
148. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
149. Christman, supra note 145, at 6.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2. Specifically, Distributors and Retailers believe
discounted prices particularly threaten artists and smaller record shops. Id. Admittedly, the
discounting perpetuated by discounting and price wars caused thousands of smaller independent
retail chains to go out of business in the 1990s. Id. Such discounting even destabilized a number
of established national retail chains. See Carvell, supra note 12, at 113. However, antitrust
principles command that free market forces and legitimate competition, rather than schemes
devised by market participants, should determine which businesses survive in a given market.
See discussion infra Part III.
153. Robert Hilburn & Randy Lewis, Limp Bizkit's Starfish Proves To Be a Best Buy But
Controversy Builds over Retailer Dropping the Price of Group's Hot-Selling Album, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2000, at Calendar, at 28.
154. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321.
155. Id.
2001] RECORD DISTRIBUTORS' MINIMUM ADVERTISED PRICE PROVISIONS 453
agreements between Distributors and Retailers. 56 In both orientations, the
distinct anti-competitive effects of MAPs arguably renders them unlawful
restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
A. Distributors Possess Significant Market Power
Market power in the antitrust context connotes the ability of a
business or a group of businesses to raise prices above competitive levels
without causing demand to drop 157 or "without incurring a loss in sales that
more than outweighs the benefits of the higher price."' 58  This power is
evident when the price and supply of the goods in question are not
consistent with, or responsive to, consumer demand. 1
59
In a market dominated by a few competitors, the market power of
those competitors is especially important in evaluating an allegedly anti-
competitive practice1 60 and may indeed serve as a "surrogate for [the]
detrimental effects"'161 of that practice. In Sugar Institute v. United
States,162 the Supreme Court held unlawful an arrangement among fifteen
competing sugar refiners to announce price changes in advance.' 63  The
Court emphasized that the refiners processed almost all of the imported raw
sugar refined domestically, and supplied seventy to eighty percent of the
sugar consumed in the United States. 164 The Court reasoned that although
the refiners had not explicitly agreed to price fix, their arrangement was
156. Id.
157. See Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1553, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
158. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 2.06[A], at 27-30.
159. Id. § 4.08, at 137-38. Particularly in recent years, "the determination of the degree of
market power has become a central focus of many antitrust cases ranging from agreements among
competitors to behavior by single firms to mergers." Id. § 2.01, at 10.
160. Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). The gravity of
market power as a factor in Supreme Court cases generally depends on the pertinent market and
the nature of the restraint imposed. Mark R. Patterson, The Role of Power in the Rule of Reason,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 429, 430 (2000). In particular, the Court has not required a showing of
market power in rule of reason cases where anti-competitive effects are evident and has restricted
that showing in per se cases to the characteristics of the power at issue. Id. In contrast, many
lower courts require a general showing of market power as a threshold requirement in rule of
reason cases. Id. Factors considered important in assessing market power include "the
percentage of business controlled" by the dominant competitor(s) and "the strength of the
remaining competition." Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 527.
161. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 447 (quoting 7 P. AREEDA ANTITRUST LAW 1511,
at 429 (1986)).
162. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
163. Id. at 602.
164. Id. at 571-72.
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reprehensible because it capitalized on their market power to influence
sugar prices in an anti-competitive manner.
165
Comparably in United States v. Container Corp.,' 66 the Supreme
Court found significant the fact that defendants controlled ninety percent of
the market for containers they manufactured. 167  The Court underscored
defendants' market power in holding that an informal price exchange
arrangement between them "chill[ed] the vigor of price competition."1
68
Distributors in this case possess significant market power in
comparison to the defendants in Sugar Institute and Container Corp. The
Distributors account for approximately eighty-five percent of the domestic
prerecorded music market. 169  Further, no Reseller can elect not to
distribute any Distributor's products and remain viable, because each
Distributor distributes prerecorded music from a unique and exclusive
roster of record producing companies and artists. 170  Moreover, the
prerecorded music market is characterized by high entry barriers that limit
the entry of new competitors.' 7' Together, these factors empower the
Distributors to "chill the vigor of price competition'' 72 through their
policies. Their market power is evidenced in part by the fact that demand
for prerecorded CDs has not decreased despite increased prices, and by the
fact that they were able to raise prices without incurring a loss in sales. 1
73
Since MAPs recognizably impeded competition in the pertinent
market, the States may not need to establish market power to support their
165. Id. at 601.
166. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
167. Id. at 336.
168. Id. at 337.
169. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319. Specifically, the Distributors' product market is
the wholesale and retail sale of prerecorded music products, including CDs and cassette tapes.
Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. The geographic market is the United States. Id. According to the
FTC, the Distributors' total domestic sales from prerecorded music comprise approximately 85
percent of a $13.7 billion total. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319. An industry trade
association estimates the total domestic sales for prerecorded music at $14.6 billion. See
Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. Naturally, it is safe to assume that these figures will fluctuate
based on a variety of changing factors in the market including customer purchasing, volume of
products distributed in a given period, etc. See, e.g., KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at
4-8.
170. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321; Complaint, supra note 6, at 10-11.
171. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
172. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 337.
173. See Scott & Duryee, supra note 2 (reporting that despite industry concerns over piracy
availed by digital downloading over the Internet, "sales are hardly slipping" and that according to
NARM, "consumers spent a record $9.1 billion on CDs" in 1999); Don Jeffrey, Music Biz Looks
to Challenges Ahead, BILLBOARD, Mar. 13, 1999, at 5 (noting United States album sales grew 5.3
percent in 1999).
2001] RECORD DISTRIBUTORS' MINIMUM ADVERTISED PRICE PROVISIONS 455
suit. 174 Yet, given the lower courts' reliance on market power in assessing
anti-competitive effect, 175 the Distributors' substantial market power could
be considered a "surrogate for [the] detrimental effects" 76 of MAPs.
B. MAPs Suggest an Unlawful Horizontal Restraint Among Distributors
Distributors compete with one another in that each manufactures and
distributes prerecorded music products to Resellers for retail sale. 177 In this
orientation, the Distributors' collective enactment of MAPs potentially
represents a horizontal combination in restraint of trade under section 1. 178
1. MAPs May Be the Product of a Tacit Combination Among the
Distributors
Evidence of a overt agreement between the Distributors concerning
MAPs or CD prices has not been discovered to date. 7 9 Defendants in
antitrust actions, however, are rarely found to have agreed to price fix
overtly. 80 Therefore, as in most section 1 cases, the court must imply the
existence of a combination among the Distributors from the circumstances
surrounding the implementation of MAPs.'18  In this case, the conscious
parallel conduct of Distributors, bolstered by numerous plus factors, may
support a tacit combination under section 1.
174. Ind Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 ("[T]he purpose of the inquiries into... market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition, [and] proof of actual detrimental effects, such as reduction of output can obviate the
need for an inquiry into market power") (quoting 7 P. AREEDA ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429
(1986)).
175. See, e.g., Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 569 (1992); see also Patterson, supra
note 160, at 430.
176. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 (quoting 7 P. AREEDA ANTITRUST LAW 1511,
at 429 (1986)).
177. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.
178. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 730 (stating combinations among competitors are
horizontal in orientation for the purposes of § 1 analysis).
179. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.
180. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.15[A], at 181.
181. Id.
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a. Distributors' Conscious Parallel Conduct Reflects a Tacit Combination
In Interstate Circuit v. United States,'82 the Supreme Court held a
combination is tacit where "knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the
scheme and participated in it."' 83 Under this standard, a "meeting of the
minds" is implied where the alleged violators participated or acquiesced in
a pattern of uniform business conduct.1
84
In this case, the Distributors' collective enactment of MAPs is parallel
both in time and in substance. Between 1992 and 1993, Distributors
adopted an initial series of MAPs in response to pressure from Retailers.
85
Between 1995 and 1996, Distributors modified those MAPs such that they
contained almost identical terms. 186  Thereafter, Distributors announced
MAPs to Retailers in a series of publicized announcements.1 87 Principally,
unity of purpose, a common design, or a shared understanding between
competitors may be sufficient to establish a tacit combination.
88
Accordingly, the Distributors' conscious parallel enactment of MAPs may
evidence a tacit combination.1 89 This is so whether Distributors enacted
MAPs through a manifest meeting of the minds or by acquiescing to the
scheme of one another. 190
If the States cannot establish unity of purpose, a common design, or a
shared understanding, they may introduce the Distributors' motives as
evidence of a tacit combination.' 91 In this case, the instability of the retail
market combined with pressure from Retailers was motive for Distributors
182. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
183. Id. at 226.
184. MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948)); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1992)).
185. Carvell, supra note 12, at 112.
186. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
187. See Christman, supra note 107, at 86; Christman, supra note I 11, at 3.
188. See Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding a
"knowing wink" between competitors may be sufficient to confirm a combination).
189. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939); Esco Corp., 340
F.2d at 1007; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958).
190. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 260 F.2d at 397. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., a group of
competing manufacturers made arrangements, while attending a trade association meeting, to
raise price on a specified date. Id. at 400. One competitor who was not in attendance at the
meeting was later informed of the other manufacturers' arrangement before that arrangement was
publicized. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that the competitor's raising of its prices before
publication evidenced its interdependence with other manufacturers. Id.
191. See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 214 (3d Cir. 1992).
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to take collective action. 192 The concurrent pressure on the Distributors'
wholesale margins (caused by declining retail prices) was further motive. 
193
By themselves, neither the opportunity to act collectively nor the capacity
to do so establish the existence of a combination.' 94 In this case, however,
Distributors had the capacity to act collectively as a result of their market
power, 195 and they capitalized on the opportunity to do so by enacting
MAPs market-wide and enforcing them with sanctions. 1
96
The Distributors' likely defense, that their parallel conduct is simply a
characteristic of an oligopoly, is possible but not persuasive. 197 Under the
oligopoly pricing theory, conscious parallel conduct among a small number
of competitors may be a natural phenomenon of a concentrated market,
because each competitor must swiftly respond to the conduct of its co-
competitors to remain competitive. 198  Thus, what appears conscious
parallel conduct among oligopoly members may be the product of their
independent responses motivated by pro-competitive objectives. 99  In
evaluating the Distributors' defense, the question is whether their parallel
adoption of MAPs is a result of collective action or whether it is an
independent reaction by each distributor stemming from a competitive
response to market conditions.00
In this case, the Distributors' contemporaneous adoption,
modification, implementation, and enforcement of MAPs appears
collective. To begin with, the MAP of each Distributor contains almost
identical terms.201  Further, the uniform increase in each Distributor's
wholesale prices within a relatively short time period, coupled with the
absence of any discounting, reflects coordination rather than
competition.
20
2
Moreover, the Distributors' matching practices of fielding complaints
from Retailers and then sanctioning Discounters reflects collective
192. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
193. Id.
194. Capital Imaging Assoc. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 545 (2d
Cir. 1993).
195. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
196. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460-61 (1986) (market power may be
evaluated to determine "whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition.").
197. An oligopoly is a concentrated market characterized by a small number of competitors.
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.15[B], at 193.
198. Id. § 4.15[B], at 193-94.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
202. Clark, supra note 11, at 905-06.
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action.20 3 This practice may signify a tactic by which Distributors used
Retailers to police and maintain a tacit combination.20 4 Alternatively, the
Retailers' insistence that Distributors enact and enforce MAPs (to
counteract the ability of Discounters to discount), and the Distributors'
conformity therewith, may have forged a combination among the
Distributors by motivating them to take collective action.20 5
Finally, the fact that MAPs were adopted to impede retail competition
and to increase CD prices contradicts the premise that parallel conduct in
an oligopoly stems from a competitive response. 20 6 As recognized by the
industry itself, the increase in CD prices despite retail competition is
attributable to MAPs. °7 In perspective, Distributors are in a less defensible
position than the defendants in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corp.,208 where the plaintiffs failed to show that co-defendants
knew of each other's conduct.20 9 Distributors in this case were admittedly
203. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02[B], at 229; see also Wall Prods. Co. v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 316 (N.D. Ca. 1971) (holding defendants' withdrawal of
price exceptions pursuant to announced and unannounced policies compelled conclusion that the
defendants were engaged in a tacit understanding by "acquiescence coupled with assistance" to
stabilize the prices of gypsum wallboard).
204. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02[B], at 229. But see Ctr. Video
Indus. Co. v. United Media, 995 F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the complaint-termination
process does not substantiate an accord unless there exists an actual agreement setting resale
prices with a "certain amount of specificity").
205. See In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding retailer with
significant market power orchestrated an agreement among manufacturers by insisting that
manufacturers boycott discounters and by securing manufacturers' commitment in that endeavor).
206. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02[B], at 229; Lykes Pasco, Inc. v.
Ahava Dairy Prods. Corp., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,011, at 81,012 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25,
1997) (finding no combination among orange growers that correspondingly raised their prices,
because the price increase was legitimately related to an acute shortage of oranges).
207. Christman, supra note 107, at 86. As early as 1996, Billboard, a respected trade
publication, proclaimed that "since these policies have come into play, sanity appears to be
returning to ... pricing." Id. The trend was expressly acknowledged by Retailer Trans World in
its 1998 securities filing, which stated that "enforcement of the MAP Program has been
successful in stabilizing prices in the industry." Complaint, supra note 6, at 18.
208. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
209. Id. at 541-42. At a minimum, the unanimity of the Distributors' conduct raises a
genuine issue of material fact thus making it likely that a summary judgment in their favor will be
denied. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21 (1986)
(holding the distributors would have to establish that their conduct is equally as "consistent with
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy" to succeed at summary judgment).
Conversely, the States will likely not be able to succeed at summary judgment either, as they
would have to produce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that Distributors acted
independently of each other. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
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aware of the impact discounting had on each other's margins and aware of
each other's efforts concerning MAPs.2t0
b. Plus Factors Support a Tacit Combination
Because evidence of conscious parallel conduct is by itself
insufficient to imply a combination,2t the States must establish plus factors
that support a combination. Numerous plus factors are evident in this case.
The first plus factor is that the Distributors' enactment and
enforcement of MAPs is a significant departure from their prior conduct.
212
To illustrate, the Distributors' previous COOPs did not define the
advertisement term to include all in-store signs and displays.21 3 Nor did the
previous definition extend to all media advertisement.214 Further, the
Distributors' vigorous sanctioning of non-complying Discounters departed
from their treatment of Resellers before MAPs.
215
A second plus factor is that Distributors had a substantial profit
motive to enact MAPs.21 6 The entry of Discounters into the prerecorded
music market triggered intense competition that decreased retail CD
217prices. Distributors were aware that decreasing retail prices would
consequently depress their wholesale prices. 218  This threat to the
Distributors' margins provided economic incentive to keep CD prices from
decreasing and also to cause those prices to increase.21 9
Furthermore, as reasoned in Part IV.B, maintenance of the traditional
brick-and-mortar distribution system provided another incentive for
Distributors to enact MAPs. In short, intensified retail competition
210. E.g., Christman, supra note 111, at 3 (reporting that the president of BMG Distribution
and the president of PGD acknowledged MAPs as a topic of discussion at the 1997 NARM
convention).
211. Theatre Enters. Inc., 346 U.S. at 541.
212. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222-23 (stating that a radical departure from the
previous business practice may support a combination).
213. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319-20.
214. Id.
215. Compare Carvell, supra note 12, at 112 (reporting the initial delight of Distributors
with the proliferation of discounters because the discounters "were rather enjoying the big orders
placed by their new best friends in the electronics sector") with Christman, supra note 107, at 86
(reporting the publicized threats of PGD to "cut off' any reseller discovered advertising below
MAP-specified minimum prices).
216. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222 (stating the prospect of increased profits provides a
strong motive for concerted action).
217. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
218. Id.
219. Id.; see also Christman, supra note 111, at 3.
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destabilized a number of established brick-and-mortar Retailers that
comprise the Distributors' key product outlet.220 By enacting MAPs,
Distributors were arguably able to revive destabilized Retailers and also
safeguard them from the effects of discounting. 2
A third plus factor is that each Distributor openly and uniformly
participated in a comparable plot.222 In fact, Distributors enacted almost
identical MAPs within a twelve-month period.223 On one occasion, certain
Distributors announced their modified MAPs four months before their
effective dates. 224  Within that four-month period, two other Distributors
adopted analogous provisions.225 Contemporaneously, Distributors then
publicized their efforts and implemented MAPs market-wide.226
A fourth plus factor is that the Distributors' collective action was
economically the more attractive alternative. 227  The market instability
occasioned by intensified retail competition and the consequent
destabilization of Retailers impacted Distributors simultaneously and
equally. 228  Under the prevailing market conditions, the Distributors'
independent pursuits would have contravened their collective interest.
229
For example, had only some Distributors implemented MAPs, their CDs
would have appeared overpriced in comparison to the CDs of non-MAP
Distributors.230 Such partial implementation of MAPs, or the enactment of
MAPs with dissimilar terms, would not have enabled Distributors to impact
prices market-wide; an inconsistent approach would foreseeably have
resulted in Resellers advertising each Distributor's CDs at disparate
220. Carvell, supra note 12, at 113; Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
221. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320. This course of action may more directly support
"evidence of high profit margins," which is, by itself, a plus factor. Clark, supra note 11, at 914.
222. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226 (implying participation in a common "scheme" may
evidence a combination).
223. Complaint, supra note 6, at 15.
224. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222-23 (stating a strong motivation for concerted action
exists when the potential for a substantial business loss arises); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 286-87 (1968) (noting that the inference of collective action is strengthened
where independent action contravenes the economic interests of the defendants, and therefore,
"the circumstances ... make the inference of rational, independent choice less attractive than that
of concerted action").
228. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320; Christman, supra note 107, at 86.
229. See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222-23; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 286-87.
230. Clark, supra note 11, at 913 (acknowledging that "in an oligopoly characterized by
product homogeneity, it ordinarily makes no sense for one firm to price at a given level unless its
rivals price at the same level").
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prices.23' In this light, collective enactment of MAPs was economically
attractive, because it enabled Distributors to concurrently raise retail prices
market-wide-by way of uniform price advertising-without those
increases appearing discordant to consumers.232
The final plus factor is that CD prices did not respond expectedly to
changing market conditions after MAPs were implemented. 23 3  As
approximated by one Retailer, average CD prices decreased from fifteen to
ten dollars per CD shortly after Discounters entered the retail market.
234
Yet, by 1996, decreasing CD prices gradually leveled off and then
increased.235  Thereafter, Distributors uniformly raised their wholesale
prices to Resellers market-wide.236  Billboard, a respected trade
publication, acknowledged that MAPs caused these trends.237
In sum, the circumstances surrounding MAPs evidence conscious
parallel conduct as well as plus factors that suggest a tacit combination
among the Distributors. Even if Distributors did not intend to price fix or
to participate in an agreement when enacting MAPs, they may be "held to
have intended the necessary ... consequences of their acts. 238
2. MAPs Potentially Capitalized on the Distributors' Market Power in an
Anti-competitive Manner
As discussed in Part III.A, Distributors possess significant market
power in the prerecorded music market. This power, coupled with the anti-
competitive impact of MAPs, may render the Distributors' conduct an
unlawful restraint of trade either per se or under the rule of reason.
231. See Christman, supra note 107, at 86.
232. A Billboard report supports the proposition that the MAP of PGD proved ineffective
because "the other [Distributors] didn't follow suit and didn't have strong MAP policies" and that
the effects of MAPs became apparent once other Distributors followed PGD. Christman, supra
note 107, at 86. See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 223 (noting the Distributors' parallel conduct
would have been senseless unless each distributor could expect its co-competitors to impose the
same restrictions).
233. Wall Prods. Co., 326 F. Supp. at 327; Lykes Pasco, Inc., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,011 (noting distributors' logical price increase in response to acute shortage in the market).
234. Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
235. Id. at 4, 6. The FTC affirmed this trend independent of other costs underlying CD
distribution. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
236. Id. at 17.
237. Christman, supra note 107, at 86 (reporting "a new floor price [on CDs] has been
established" since MAPs were implemented).
238. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
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a. Distributors' Conduct May Be Judged Per Se Unlawful Under
Traditional Standards
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,239 the Supreme Court
declared that any arrangement tampering with the natural price structure of
a given market violates section 1, even when "it is not established that the
[market participants] had the means available for the accomplishment of
their objective. ' 240 Such cases suggest that even those arrangements not
directly affecting price may be judged per se unlawful.24'
In this case, MAPs do not prescribe CD prices but rather restrict price
advertising.242 Further, no evidence has been discovered to indicate that
MAPs were the result of an agreement among the Distributors to fix
243price. Yet, MAPs directly affected CD prices by impeding retail price
competition and consequently causing an increase in CD prices, both retail
and wholesale. 244 Accordingly, the Distributors' enactment of MAPs may
be judged a per se unlawful horizontal combination for tampering with the
pricing structure in the prerecorded music industry. Considering the trend
away from per se analysis,245 however, the Distributors' enactment of
MAPs will likely be judged under the rule of reason.
239. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The Court considered the legality of an arrangement between
competitors to decrease the supply of petroleum products into the pertinent market. Id. at 150.
240. Id. at 224-25 n.59. According to the Court, conduct that impacts price has no inherent
social utility. 1d. Decades later in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, the Supreme
Court added that the per se prohibition of recognized price fixing restraints promotes certainty for
businesses and furthers judicial economy. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
241. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.06, at 125-26; see, e.g., United States
v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that in a market consisting of individual
service providers and consumers, concerted action by suppliers may be per se unlawful, even
where that combination does not directly involve price); cf SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note
11, § 4.06, at 125-26 (noting numerous economists consider the Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. standard
as well as its reasoning expansive).
242. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319.
243. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.
244. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
245. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.05, at 122; see e.g., Levine v. Cent. Fla.
Med. Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (stating the 11 th Circuit applies "the per se
rule 'only when history and analysis have shown that in sufficiently similar circumstances the
rule of reason unequivocally results in a finding of liability... i.e., when the conduct involved
always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output."') (quoting
Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group, Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1983);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (alteration in
original)).
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b. Distributors' Conduct May Violate the Rule of Reason
Under the rule of reason, the purpose and effect of the Distributors'
conduct is assessed. 246 In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 247 the
Supreme Court evaluated an agreement between members of a trading
committee that required all members electing to purchase grain after close
of trading to pay the price established at the close of that trading day.248
Despite its potential anti-competitive impact on price, the Court upheld the
agreement because it improved market conditions on balance.249
Similarly, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,50 the Court reiterated rule of reason analysis for arrangements
impacting price and advised that the focus should be on whether a given
arrangement promotes or suppresses competition. 251 The Court invalidated
an agreement prohibiting competitive bidding among a group of engineers
because its purported benefits for public safety did not outweigh its
restriction of price competition.
2 52
Recent Supreme Court decisions continue to appraise the potential
pro-competitive effects of a given arrangement. 253 In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,254 the Court upheld a blanket
license agreement because it minimized transaction costs and facilitated
negotiations in a manner that would otherwise not be possible in that
market.2155 The Court valued that the challenged arrangement was devised
to promote economic efficiency and to foster competition.256
Comparably in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,25 7 the Court evaluated a joint venture arrangement between
collegiate athletic teams and their conference leagues, on the one hand, and
246. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
247. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
248. Id. at 239. Interestingly, the Court could have characterized the agreement as per se
unlawful for restricting price competition after closing hours. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 11, § 4.05, at 122.
249. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 241.
250. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
251. Id. at 688.
252. Id. at 679-80.
253. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 1; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
254. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
255. Id. at 21-22, 24.
256. Id. at 20.
257. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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television networks on the other.2  The Court considered three plausible
pro-competitive justifications offered by defendants, 259 but ultimately
rejected them as insufficient to outweigh the anti-competitive effect of the
arrangement.26 °
Finally in FTC v. California Dental Ass 'n,261 the Court assessed the
competitive impact of advertising restrictions in the code of ethics of a
262state dental association. The restrictions prohibited members from
advertising, among other things, discounted fees, even in advertisements
that were truthful and non-deceptive.263 The Court upheld the restrictions,
reasoning that they perceivably protected consumers from the dangers of
misleading advertising as well as enabled consumers and state regulators to
receive more readily verifiable information regarding dental services.
264
The Court noted that because the restrictions were intended to avoid false
and deceptive advertising, they could have a net pro-competitive effect or
no effect on competition at all.265
Against this background, the Distributors' claim that MAPs were pro-
competitive266 seems untenable. First, MAPs did not improve market
conditions,267 as did the agreement in Chicago Board of Trade.268 Second,
there is no evidence that MAPs minimized transaction costs or promoted
efficiency in the prerecorded music market, 269 as did the license agreement
in Broadcast Music, Inc.270 Third, Distributors cannot plausibly justify
MAPs as promoting the protection and welfare of consumers, as did the
258. Id. In particular, the agreement restricted the number of games that could be broadcast,
established the number of times a given team could be broadcast, and set a price for the telecasts.
Id. at 91-94.
259. Specifically, the justifications were that the arrangement: 1) minimized the loss of
game attendance; 2) minimized loss of athletic program revenues and 3) increased revenues by
spreading income among a greater number of schools. Id. at 97.
260. Id. at 120.
261. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
262. Id. at 756.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 773, 775.
265. Id. at 771. The Court noted that pro-competitive justifications should be considered
unless an "observer with.., a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anti-competitive effect on customers and markets." Id.
at 770.
266. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 145, at 6; Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
267. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
268. See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 231, 239-241.
269. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
270. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20-21.
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advertising restrictions in California Dental Ass'n. 27 1  To the contrary,
MAPs were enacted to suppress price competition, and they achieved that
goal with increased prices and consumer harm as a consequence.2 72 Even if
the States are unable to establish the anti-competitive effects of MAPs
directly, case law permits them to offer the Distributors' market power as
alternative evidence of such.273
Finally, assuming MAPs have some pro-competitive justifications, the
court will give those justifications latitude under the rule of reason.
274
However, the court is obligated to exercise discipline by declining those
justifications that are essentially a collateral attempt to salvage what is truly
anti-competitive.27 5 Considering again the harm MAPs caused to consumer
and to competition, 276 the pro-competitive justifications presented by
Distributors will likely be judged a collateral salvage attempt.27 7
In sum, the parallel conduct of Distributors in implementing MAPs
bolstered by plus factors may support a tacit combination among the
Distributors to tamper with CD prices. Since no evidence of an overt
agreement to price fix exists,278 the per se rule will likely not apply. 279 Yet,
the Distributors' conduct may be judged an unlawful horizontal restraint of
trade under the rule of reason due to the anti-competitive effect of MAPs
271. See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 772. Especially important to the Supreme Court in
California Dental Ass 'n was that the restricted advertisements were in "a market for professional
services, in which advertising is relatively rare and the comparability of service packages not
easily established. Id. According to the Court, "the difficulty for customers or potential
competitors to get and verify information about the price and availability of services magnifies
the dangers to competition associated with misleading advertising." Id.
272. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
273. Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff is obliged
to prove market power where "actual detrimental effects" cannot be established). A mere
showing of market power by itself, however, may not be sufficient to prove detrimental market
effect. See KMB Warehouse Distribs. v. Walker Mfg., Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995)
(expressing that "[t]here must be other grounds to believe that the defendant's behavior will harm
competition market-wide, such as the inherent anti-competitive nature of the defendant's behavior
or the structure of the.., market").
274. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1112 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190
(1995).
275. Id.
276. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319.
277. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 ("[A] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with.. antitrust law.").
Because MAPs increased prices, they cannot be likened to a practice that increases economic
efficiency and is, therefore, pro-competitive. See Broad Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 18-23.
278. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.
279. See Lie, 964 F.2d at 569 (asserting only combinations that are "'so plainly anti-
competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality"' are per
se unlawful) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
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on balance.280 Whether Distributors intended that effect will not validate
their otherwise anti-competitive conduct.28'
C. MAPs Exemplify Unlawful RPM Agreements Between Distributors and
Retailers
Distributors operate at a different level in the distribution chain than
Resellers, because Distributors manufacture and distribute prerecorded
music products to the latter for resale.282 In this orientation, each Retailer's
execution of MAPs as directed by each Distributor potentially represents an
RPM agreement in restraint of trade under section 1.283
1. MAPs Embody a Conscious Commitment to a Common Scheme
As with horizontal combinations, parties in the vertical orientation
rarely agree to fix prices overtly.284 Thus, the court must imply an RPM
agreement between Distributors and Retailers from the circumstances
surrounding the parties' implementation of MAPs. 285 In this case, MAPs
likely embody a conscious commitment to the common scheme of
impeding price competition and raising CD prices.
a. MAPs Are the Products Of Consensual RPM Agreements
In United States v. Colgate & Co.,286 the Supreme Court evaluated a
distributor's practice of influencing the resale price of products it
distributed to retailers. 28 7  The distributor's practice included prior
announcement of desired resale prices, urging of dealer compliance with
those prices, and termination of sales to dealers failing to adhere to those
288prices. The Court declined to imply an RPM agreement, reasoning that
280. See Lie, 964 F.2d at 569 (reiterating rule of reason analysis balances whether the
combination at issue promotes competition or harms it).
281. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (stressing "a good intention" will not "save an
otherwise objectionable regulation").
282. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321.
283. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (stating
combinations between businesses at different levels in the distribution chain are vertical in
orientation for the purposes of section 1 analysis).
284. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.15[A], at 181, § 5.02, at 218, 222-23.
285. Id. § 5.02, at 218.
286. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
287. Id. at 304.
288. Id. at 303.
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the distributor's conduct was entirely unilateral.2 89  Under this standard,
communication between distributors and retailers by itself does not
consummate an RPM agreement, even if the communication directly
290pertains to price. Yet, an RPM agreement is consummated when the
291
evidence contravenes unilateral action, or when a meeting of the minds is
evident.2 92 Such an agreement may be implied absent proof of an oral or a
written contract.293
In this case, the parties' interaction regarding MAPs reflects a
meeting of the minds rather than unilateral communication by Distributors.
To begin with, Retailers repeatedly urged Distributors to respond to
decreasing retail CD prices with strict MAPs.29 4 Contemporaneously,
Distributors acknowledged Retailers' pleas publicly and communicated
their intent to respond accordingly.295 After Distributors responded with
MAPs, Retailers openly praised their response and proceeded to execute
MAPs.
296
Retailers' practice of informing Distributors about MAP-defying
Discounters, and the Distributors' sanctioning of those Discounters in
retort,297 also reflects a meeting of the minds. The collaboration typifies a
situation where "independent activity by a single entity [can] be
289. Id. at 307.
290. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1984). The parties
may in fact communicate regarding pricing and promotion strategies. Id. at 762.
291. Id. at 761.
292. See MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 973, 975
(7th Cir. 1995).
293. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 217 (1921) (Pitney, J.,
dissenting).
294. Complaint, supra note 6, at 16. For example, Stan Gorman, senior vice president of
Tower Records and Video asserted: "The industry should police mass-merchant [discounters)
who advertise and sell music at a loss." Christman, supra note 111, at 3.
295. Id. Responding to Retailers' pleas for MAPs, Jim Caparro, president of PGD
commented: "I understand their concern [and] we need to evaluate whether that is the next step
in the evolution of our policy." Id.
296. Complaint, supra note 6, at 16; Christman, supra note 107, at 86 (reporting Retailers
pleaded with Distributors to fortify their MAPs at the 1995 NARM convention, PGD was "the
first major [Distributor] to react to the [Retailers'] plight" and soon thereafter, "BMG Distribution
and Sony Music Distribution bolstered their MAP policies"); Christman, supra note 11, at 3
(reporting Sony Music Distribution raised its MAP price in "respon[se] to numerous pleas from
music specialty merchants").
297. See Christman, supra note I 11, at 3 (publicizing the comments of two Retailers'
executives expressly calling for Distributors to enact MAPs and to punish any discounters that
defied them).
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distinguished from a concerted effort by more than one entity.... 98
Accordingly, the Distributor-Retailer interaction in this case is one where
an RPM agreement "might be implied from [the] course of dealing or other
circumstances. 299
b. Coerced MAPs May Have Consummated RPM Agreements
In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,300 the Supreme Court
considered whether a manufacturer's declaration to retailers, that they
would be cut off from supplies if they sold for less than suggested prices,
coupled with the retailers' compliance therewith, consummated an RPM
agreement. 301 The Court held an RPM agreement may be consummated
where a manufacturer coerces adherence to its prices in a way that exceeds
a unilateral effort to communicate a desired price.30 2 The Court reasoned
that the manufacturer's threats of refusal to deal amounted to a "vehicle to
gain ... participation in [a] program to [secure] the retailers' adherence to
the suggested retail prices.' 30 3 Lower courts have recently followed the
reasoning that a meeting of the minds can occur absent voluntary consent
to a given scheme.
30 4
In this case, Distributors openly coerced certain Discounters to
execute MAPs.3 °5 After being sanctioned for defying MAP terms, for
example, one Discounter communicated to the punishing Distributor its
resolve to comply. 30 6 Another Discounter obtained prior approval from a
Distributor regarding its promotional efforts to avoid violating that
Distributor's MAP.30 7 Under the standard announced in Parke, Davis and
298. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986); cf Capital Imaging Assocs. v.
Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he mere opportunity
to conspire does not by itself support the inference that such an illegal combination occurred.").
299. See Frey & Son, Inc., 256 U.S. at 210; In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding insistence by a retailer with significant market power, that toy manufacturers
either boycott discounters or deal with them on less favorable terms, and manufacturers'
compliance therewith, forged a vertical arrangement between the parties).
300. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
301. Id. at 45.
302. See id. at 43.
303. Id. at 46.
304. See, e.g., MCM Partners, Inc., 62 F.3d at 973, 975 (expressing that "[s]o long as
defendants knew that they were acquiescing in conduct that was in all likelihood unlawful ...
they thereby joined a combination").
305. Complaint, supra note 6, at 16; FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
306. Complaint, supra note 6, at 16.
307. Id.
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comparable cases, even those Discounters that were coerced into executing
MAPs could be considered parties to an RPM agreement.
30 8
2. MAPs Channeled the Distributors' Market Power Through Retailers To
Suppress Price Competition
a. MAPs May Be Judged Per Se Unlawful
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,30 9 the
Supreme Court held that "a vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it
includes some agreement on price or price levels., 310  MAPs do not
prescribe CDs prices but rather restrict price advertising. 31' Thus, the
legality of MAPs is subject to rule of reason analysis under Business
Electronics Corp.312
Lower courts, however, may evaluate MAPs more strictly.313  In
DeLong Equipment Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co.,314  a
manufacturer increased its prices to a wholesaler after growing displeased
with the wholesaler's discounting below prices the manufacturer
suggested.315 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the manufacturer's
discretion to set wholesale prices, but it focused on the manufacturer's
practice of rebating portions of its wholesale revenues to wholesalers that
316charged higher resale prices. Even though the manufacturer had not
explicitly fixed resale prices, the court judged the practice a per se unlawful
RPM agreement because the manufacturer employed the price
308. Whether one party's ability to independently make pricing decisions is restricted by
another party is a considerable factor in evaluating formation of an RPM agreement. See Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 33-36; Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 945,
955 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (expressing "the reseller or wholesalers must be free to make [its] own
independent pricing determination"); cf Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of N.Y. Inc., 24
F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 1994) (permitting a manufacturer's unilateral requirement that distributors
sell promotional products at a predetermined price).
309. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
310. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 735-36.
311. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319-20.
312. The lower courts have arguably followed the rule annunciated in Business Electronics
Corp. too strictly. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02[B], at 228. See, e.g., Ctr.
Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., 995 F.2d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing to infer a
manufacturer-dealer agreement to maintain resale price where the manufacturer terminated a
price cutting dealer after receiving complaints about the price cutter from a dealer that was
charging higher prices).
313. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
314. 990 F.2d 1186 (1 lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993).
315. Id. at 1200.
316. Id.
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announcement and rebate scheme as an anti-competitive tool to pad
prices.317
MAPs are analogous to the practice in DeLong. To begin with,
Distributors were troubled with the prices charged by Discounters,1 8 as
was the manufacturer with wholesalers in DeLong.319  Further, the
Distributors' withholding COOP funds from Discounters (that refused to
advertise the MAP-specified minimum) 320 parallels the manufacturer's
withholding rebates from discounting wholesalers in DeLong.32' Finally,
MAPs were implemented with the purpose of padding wholesale and retail
CD prices, 322 comparable to the scheme in DeLong.323 As such, MAPs
could be judged per se unlawful tools to pad prices under strict lower court
interpretations.324
b. MAPs Likely Violate the Rule of Reason
Considering the Supreme Court holding in Business Electronics Corp.
and the trend away from per se analysis, 325 MAPs will likely be evaluated
under the rule of reason. The rationale is that under certain circumstances,
vertical agreements benefit competitors and consumers in accord with
antitrust principles.326 Further supporting rule of reason analysis in this
case is that MAPs did not explicitly fix price.327  Despite these
considerations, MAPs likely amount to unlawful RPM agreements.
First, MAPs have no apparent pro-competitive effect. 328 MAPs were
not implemented to induce Retailers to invest capital and labor in a market
where goods are unknown to consumers.329 Prerecorded music products
are, in fact, highly popular with consumers. 330 Further, MAPs were not
implemented to help Retailers hire and train sales personnel or to help fund
317. Id. at 1201.
318. Christman, supra note 107, at 86; Christman, supra note 111, at 3.
319. See DeLong Equip. Co., 990 F.2d at 1200.
320. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320-21.
321. See DeLong Equip. Co., 990 F.2d at 1200.
322. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320-21.
323. See DeLong Equip. Co., 990 F.2d at 1200.
324. Id. at 1201.
325. SULLVAN& HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.05, at 122.
326. Id. § 5.02[B], at 229-30; see e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 772-73.
327. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319-20.
328. Id. at 31320.
329. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724-25.
330. See Scott & Duryee, supra note 2; Gibeaut, supra note 26, at 38; Jeffrey, supra note
173, at 5.
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service and repair facilities. Moreover, MAPs cannot be justified as
protecting consumers from misleading or hazardous advertising in a market
in which advertising is generally rare or price dissemination and
verification difficult.
332
Second, MAPs were not devised to counter "free riding."333  Free
riding occurs when a discounter, providing the same goods or services as a
retailer, capitalizes on the promotional or marketing efforts of a retailer,
thereby denying the retailer the complete fruits of its investments with
respect to those goods or services.334 Discounters in this case provided
services that were as good as, or superior to, those provided by Retailers,
despite the fact that Discounters charged lower prices.335
Third, MAPs strayed beyond the permissible COOP by effectively
disabling Resellers from pricing CDs independently.336  The traditional
COOP does not raise antitrust concerns because only those advertisements
paid for, in whole or in part, by the distributor are restricted.337 Price fixing
is of little concern, because the reseller remains free to advertise at
whatever price it desires in those advertisements paid for entirely by the
reseller.338
In this case, MAPs technically allowed Resellers to sell at any price,
yet Distributors withheld all COOP funds unless Resellers displayed the
MAP price in all media advertisements and in-store displays including
331. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724, 728. Such an arrangement with retailers could be
considered pro-competitive. See Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 762-63.
332. Cal. Dental Ass"n, 526 U.S. at 772-73.
333. See infra notes 337-38 and accompanying text; FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
334. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02, at 218-19. To illustrate, suppose a
retailer sets up shop in a high-traffic shopping area, offers product X, teaches its sales personnel
about that product, and begins to heavily advertise that product. Id. Further, suppose that a
discounter sets up shop in a low-rent area and proceeds to offer product X for retail. Id. Yet, the
discounter advertises just enough to make its presence known and does not teach its sales
personnel more than what is required to make the sale. Id. Considering its lower operating costs,
the discounter would be able to sell product X at a lower cost. Id. In this case, the discounter
would be free riding by benefiting from retailers' investment in promotion of product X yet
earning a greater profit as a result of selling cheaper. See id.
335. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
336. See In re American Cyanamid Co., 123 F.T.C 1257, 1265 (1997) ("[B]oth the courts
and the [FTC] have judged cooperative advertising cases under the rule of reason, as long as the
arrangements do not limit the dealer's right: (1) to discount below the advertised price, and (2) to
advertise at any price when the dealer pays for the advertisement.").
337. Balto, supra note 32, at 99, n.214; see also In re American Cyanamid Co., 123 F.T.C.,
at 1267-68 (holding a distributor's "conditioning [rebate] payments on dealers' charging a
specified minimum price amounted to the quidpro quo of an agreement on resale prices").
338. Balto, supra note 32, at 99, n.214; see In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) (holding COOP arrangements are not illegal
per se where the dealer remains free to set resale price).
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those advertisements not funded by the Distributors.339 Given that almost
all Resellers rely heavily on COOP funds, MAPs pressured acceptance of
their terms.3 40 One prominent national Discounter, for example, actually
declined MAPs in order to advertise freely but eventually accepted them
after losing millions in COOP funds.341  By disabling Resellers' ability to
effectively communicate discounts to consumers, MAPs caused antitrust
injury.
342
To ensure MAP compliance, Distributors and Retailers combined
their efforts to police MAPs market-wide.343 Any Reseller that failed to
adhere to the MAP-specified minimum could be suspended from all COOP
funds. 344 A Reseller's single violation at one store jeopardized COOP
funds for the entire chain.345 A number of Resellers were, in fact, publicly
sanctioned for failing to comply with MAPs.346 In effect, although MAPs
were implemented as part of a COOP, economic reality essentially obliged
market-wide communication of price according to their terms rather than
free market forces.347
339. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319, 31321.
340. See id. at 31321; Carvell, supra note 12, at 112-13. On many occasions, the
promotions funds are greater than what Resellers pay to actually advertise. Complaint, supra
note 6, at 11.
341. Christman, supra note 107, at 86 (reporting the decision of Circuit City to begin
implementing MAPs because it was "in danger of losing millions of dollars in advertising
funds. . . that underwrite its loss-leader pricing strategies").
342. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321 (stating antitrust injury results from an "inability
to effectively communicate discounts to consumers").
343. Complaint, supra note 6, at 15-16. Retailers policed compliance with MAPs by
alerting Distributors of any violators at the retail level, and Distributors enforced compliance by
aggressively sanctioning defiant discounters. Id. at 16. An argument can be made that Retailers'
informing Distributors of MAP-defying discounters, and Distributors' subsequent sanctioning of
discounters forged a horizontal combination among the Distributors. SULLIVAN & HARRISON,
supra note 11, § 5.02[B], at 229; see In re Toys "R'" Us, Inc., 221 F.3d at 930. The same
argument can be made to support the inference of a horizontal agreement among the Retailers.
See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 736 (Stevens, J. & White, J., dissenting) (opining such
complaint-response tactics could be considered RPM agreements); see also SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 11, § 5.02, at 229 (expressing an RPM agreement could be a way for a
group of competitors to police a horizontal arrangement by keeping retailers in line). But see Ctr.
Video, 995 F.2d at 738 (declaring complaint-response tactics are not actionable absent an actual
agreement specifying price with a "certain amount of specificity").
344. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31319.
345. Dale K. Dupont, States: CD Prices Fixed, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1.
346. Christman, supra note 107, at 86.
347. Santa Clara Valley Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 556 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir.
1977) (declaring unlawful COOP arrangement by which adherence to a suggested retail price is
exacted as a quid pro quo for receipt of COOP funds); FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321
("[E]ven absent an actual agreements, [the] inability to effectively communicate discounts to
consumers meant that retailers had little incentive to actually sell product at a discount.").
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Fourth, MAPs were enacted with an anti-competitive purpose
premised on the Distributors' market power.348 Each Distributor distributes
music from its own unique and exclusive roster of record producing
companies and artists.3 49 Consequently, Resellers could not simply choose
to forgo a given Distributor's MAP and obtain the product from an
alternate Distributor.350  Dependence on the Distributors' unique products
pressured acceptance of MAPs from a different angle.35'
Finally, MAPs achieved their anti-competitive purpose by
suppressing discount advertising and, ultimately, discounting itself.
35 2
While MAPs were implemented, Resellers broadly advertised CDs to
consumers at or above the MAP-specified minimum. 353 Consumers, having
seen those advertisements, entered retail stores market-wide expecting to
pay the price as advertised.354 In this light, MAPs effectively functioned as
restrictions on price itself.
355
In sum, MAPs appear to be the product of a conscious commitment
between Distributors and Retailers to employ price advertising to impede
competition and fix prices.356  As expressed by the Supreme Court, price
advertising "serves to inform the public of the.., prices of products and
348. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320; Part III.A, supra; Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. at 460-61 (stating market power may be evaluated to determine "whether an arrangement
has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition").
349. Complaint, supra note 6, at 10-11.
350. Id. Doing so would result in that reseller having an incomplete collection of musical
artists. See id.
351. Where market power is lacking, arrangements raising price will prompt consumers to
seek the same product elsewhere. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 11, § 4.07, at 127. Higher
prices will also motivate potential competitors to bring cheaper goods into the market. Id. In this
case, however, the prerecorded music products of each Distributor are highly unique therefore
consumers were unable to simply seek a substitute product. See FTC Notices, supra note 4.
Because market power in this case actualized the potential for anti-competitive effect, it can be
used as an alternative basis for proving an antitrust violation. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 11, § 4.08, at 139.
352. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31321; see Bates v. State Bar ofAriz., 433 U.S. 350, 377
(1977) (stating "[w]here consumers have the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are
dramatically lower than they would be without advertising."); In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 221 F.3d at
930 (holding unlawful a non-price vertical restraint that deprived consumers of lower prices
offered by discounters and insulated established retailers from the competitive pressure of those
discounters).
353. See FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
354. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 17; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374, 388 (1992) (stating state restrictions on the fares advertised by an airline had a significant
and forbidden impact on the fares themselves).
355. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 377) ("[R]estrictions on the ability
to advertise prices normally make it more difficult for consumers to find a lower price and for
competitors to compete on the basis of price.").
356. See generally FTC Notices, supra note 4; Complaint, supra note 6.
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services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system., 357 By shortchanging free market
forces from forging and communicating prices without any discernable pro-
competitive justification, MAPs likely amount to unlawful RPM
agreements in restraint of trade under the rule of reason.
IV. MAP PROVISIONS COST THE MUSIC INDUSTRY AND DELAYED ITS
EVOLUTION IN THE DIGITAL ERA
A. MAPs Indirectly Fostered Music Piracy
Current technology enables consumers to obtain prerecorded music
by means other than conventional retail purchase.358 The Distributors' and
Retailers' implementation of MAPs arguably facilitated this occasion by
increasing CD prices. The intersection of these events may have fostered
music piracy.
359
After dropping in the early 1990s, retail CD prices have increased by
more than two dollars each.360 Aware of decreasing manufacturing costs
and more efficient production technology, 361 consumers are irritated with
paying upwards of eighteen dollars for a CD.362 Considering that CDs
replaced cassette tapes as the primary delivery medium of prerecorded
music a decade ago,363 Distributors and Retailers cannot persuasively base
CD prices on the novelty of the technology. The growing perception
among consumers is that record industry conglomerates raise prices to pad
margins and to impede Discounters from offering lower prices. In
purpose and in effect, MAPs confirm this perception.365
357. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
358. Greg Kot, Who Stole Metallica's Money? Record Companies Are the Culprits, Not
Napster Users, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 17, 2000, at Tempo, at 1.
359. Piracy refers to the unauthorized duplication of music for sale or exchange via either
counterfeiting hard copies of CDs or swapping music sound files online. See Gibeaut, supra note
26, at 38.
360. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
361. Sobel & Sobel, supra note 3, at 8.
362. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
363. See id. Other delivery mediums for prerecorded music include the cassette tape and the
LP. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 4.
364. Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
365. Id. (reporting that CD prices have increased in the past few years due to "record-
company policies that punished [discounters] such as Target and Circuit City for offering [CDs]
at discount prices.").
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Dissatisfaction with inflated prices has motivated consumers to
realize less expensive, albeit illegal, alternatives of obtaining music. 3 66 One
such alternative is CD "burning," a process by which a blank CD is either
encoded with sound files downloaded over the Internet or duplicated from
another prerecorded CD.367 In contrast to cassette duplication, burning
produces a duplicate CD faster and with a level of quality matching the
original.368 Today, CD burners are commonly sold at most retail stores
offering other electronic devices. 369 Blank CDs can be purchased for less
than one dollar as the same stores.370
A second alternative to retail purchase, mp3 swapping,371 is possible
via the Internet. 372 This popular practice enables Internet users to trade
music online in the form of compressed sound files.373 Those sound files
can then be played directly from a computer hard drive, burned onto blank
CDs, or transferred to personal mp3 players sold by many electronics
Retailers.374
The growing popularity of CD burning and mp3 swapping reflects
consumer dissatisfaction with rising CD prices.375 This popularity suggests
that price is a priority to consumers.376 In addition, the proliferation of
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. The music signal duplicated in the CD burning process is a digital format therefore can
be duplicated indefinitely without loss of quality. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at
446.
369. See Best Buy Advertisement (Jan. 28, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review).
370. Id.
371. Mp3 is one of a number of compressed digital audio formats. KRASILOVSKY &
SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 446. Music prerecorded on any CD may be converted to the mp3
format by use of encoding software that may be downloaded free of charge over the Internet. Id.
An mp3 file can then be burned onto a blank CD, played directly from a computer hard drive, or
transferred onto personal mp3 players. Id. An mp3 file can also be rather easily distributed over
the Internet by, for example, attachment to email or posting on a Web site for download by
Internet users. Id.
372. Kot, supra note 358.
373. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 446.
374. Id.
375. See id; Kot, supra note 358.
376. See Gibeaut, supra note 26, at 39; Scott & Duryee, supra note 2.
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online music trading, via communities such as Napster,377 reflects
consumers' willingness to bypass retail purchase altogether.378
Distributors naturally need to charge a premium on the manufacturing
costs of CDs to cover legitimate expenses such as artist royalties,
promotion, advertising, and investments made in failed artists. 79 Profits
are comprised of revenues remaining after such expenses are recouped.380
Coupled with the need to support destabilized Retailers, this earnings
model pressured Distributors to heed Retailers' pleas and restrict minimum
price advertising with MAPs. 38' As advised by the Supreme Court,
however, restrictions on price advertising curtail the ability of consumers to
find desirable prices.382
In this case, the lack of desirable prices arguably eased consumers'
transition to CD burning and mp3 swapping. Faced with the choice of
paying upwards of eighteen dollars for a CD or obtaining the same music
for pennies, the consumer's desire to pirate becomes understandable. And,
given the Distributors' and Retailers' implementation of MAPs to keep
prices inflated, piracy becomes justifiable to even the morally astute
consumer.
383
B. MAPs Artificially Supported a Destabilized Brick-and-Mortar
Distribution System to the Impediment of More Efficient Means
Distributors' and Retailers' response to legitimate competition with
MAPs may elucidate a fundamental problem with their ability to contend
with emerging competition in the prerecorded music market.384 In this
377. Napster is an online trading community that, by means of free software provided on its
site, allows registered users to download mp3 files from each other's hard drives over the Internet
connection. Gibeaut, supra note 26, at 39. A user can search for a particular song by simply
typing the name of the artist or the title of the song on the Napster search page. Id.
378. See Scott & Duryee, supra note 2. As voiced by one consumer, Napster is popular
because "people aren't willing to pay, and yet prices aren't going down." Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See id.
382. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977).
383. Id. Some music fans are simply irate with the inflated pricing of music products. As
printed by one fan on her website, "For many, many years, we, the fans, have paid full price for
concert tickets, CDs, tapes, posters, T-shirts, etc. [so] if anyone needs to be penalized for their
actions, it's the record labels .. " Kot, supra note 358.
384. Cf BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 558 (the breakeven point on music albums,
including CDs, is high because, after production, manufacturing, promotion, and advertising costs
are totaled, a Distributor may have invested upwards of 500,000 dollars in a given CD before
selling a single copy).
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context, Distributors' and Retailers' delayed evolution is partly the
problem. Although implemented as a solution, MAPs arguably
complicated the problem.
The current physical distribution network subsists on the traditional
brick-and-mortar retail chains.385  The emergence of Discounters and
digital distribution threatens that network.386 Yet, despite these threats,
Distributors and Retailers have been "feeling around in the dark trying to
figure out what to do."
3 87
In the meantime, technological progression and competition have
spawned more efficient and less expensive means for prerecorded music to
reach consumers. 388 Those conglomerates that rely on physical distribution
may lose their place in the future of music distribution as a result of this
progression.389 As acknowledged in Billboard, "for the five major record
[Distributors], their distribution network remains their larger source of
revenues, and a complete Shift to [other distribution means] could make
them largely irrelevant. 39°  MAPs stemmed from the Distributors' and
Retailers' delay in developing more efficient means as well as their panic
to keep the physical distribution network from crumbling.
391
By reacting with MAPs, however, Distributors and Retailers
interjected their judgment for that of the free market.392 In doing so,
Distributors and Retailers further delayed their acceptance of and transition
to more efficient distribution means, both to their own detriment and to the
detriment of consumers. As a result, they tripped antitrust by impeding
market forces from forging "the best allocation of our economic resources,
385. Jeffrey, supra note 173, at 5.
386. See Carvell, supra note 12, at 112; Jeffrey, supra note 173, at 5; Chuck Philips, Media
Mega-Merger: Impact on Music: Deal Would Give Record Business a New Spin, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2000, at C11.
387. Philips, supra note 386.
388. Id.
389. See Ed Christman, The Danger of Digital Download, BILLBOARD, Mar. 13, 1999, at 63
(stating that "Wall Street appears to be betting that e-commerce eventually will significantly
cannibalize music sales from conventional record stores, if not eradicate them as a distribution
channel altogether"). But see id. (reporting opinion of digital music company president that
digital distribution will simply provide consumers another option for attaining music).
390. Jeffrey, supra note 173, at 5.
391. See id. Billboard expressed that "[p]art of the [Distributors'] panic stems from the fact
that the lock they have enjoyed for many years is now threatened." Id.
392. See Christman, supra note 389, at 63; Jeffrey, supra note 173, at 5; Kot, supra note
358; see also Christman, supra note 111, at 3 (documenting the declarations of the president of
Sony Music Distribution that "[wie don't think the consumer has the right idea about the value of
music..." and that "[w]e will work ... to correct that.").
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the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress"
393
in the prerecorded music market.
V. CONCLUSION
Although CDs entered the prerecorded music market in the 1980s and
became the primary medium for the delivery of prerecorded music by the
early 1990s, 394 CD prices have steadily increased. 395 This paradoxical trend
occurred despite increasing retail competition and despite other factors that
suggest decreasing prices.
396
Supported by an FTC investigation and a pending antitrust action, this
Comment has proposed that a distinct increase in CD prices is related to
MAPs, an anti-competitive provision involving Distributors and Retailers
of prerecorded music, and, as implemented, MAPs resemble unreasonable
restraints of trade outlawed by section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
This Comment has further posited that the Distributors' and Retailers'
implementation of MAPs has cost the music industry and delayed its
evolution. Historically, established businesses have reacted to nascent
competitors by capitalizing on market power to impede their
development.397 In this case, Discounters as well as the probable new
means of distribution represent the emerging competitors, and MAPs
embody the inhibiting reaction.
With the FTC settlement postponing MAPs for a seven-year period,398
intense retail competition has resumed, and CD prices have consequently
began to decrease. 399 As in the early 1990s, it is only a matter of time
before competitive pressure on Retailers and Distributors builds. This
time, however, Distributors and Retailers cannot resort to MAPs to offset
the pressure. As a result, the ability of Distributors and Retailers to adapt
to changing market conditions and to compete with intense competition
may prove vital in determining their survival.
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the American free enterprise
economy is premised on competition, and antitrust laws such as the
393. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
394. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 4.
395. Sobel & Sobel, supra note 3, at 8.
396. Id.
397. Balto, supra note 32, at 105.
398. FTC Notices, supra note 4, at 31320.
399. Hilburn & Lewis, supra note 153, at 28. On Sunday, October 15, 2000, Best Buy
advertised the highly anticipated third release of rap-rockers Limp Bizkit for $9.99, close to $2
below the CD's wholesale cost. Id.
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Sherman Act preserve and facilitate that competition. 400  Rather than
impede inevitable market forces via anti-competitive provisions,
Distributors and Retailers are better served by adapting.401 Their strategy
should focus on ways to reduce prices and to entice customers to purchase
their products, rather than making it more justifiable for them to pirate.40 2
By doing so, Distributors and Retailers will not trip antitrust during their
pursuit of revenue, control, and survival in the openly competitive digital
era.
H. Damian Elahi*
400. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
401. See Christman, supra note 389, at 63 (reporting "[tihere is an awful lot riding on how
the [Distributors] get into the digital-distribution business").
402. See Philips, supra note 386.
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